Peircean semiotics in the context of design praxis: Abduction and perception in dialogue by Rampazzo Gambarato, Renira
424 Renira Rampazzo Gambarato
Peircean semiotics in the context of design praxis: 
Abduction and perception in dialogue
Renira Rampazzo Gambarato
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow
Faculty of Media Communications
Building 5, 2/8 Khitrovskij Pereulok
101990 Moscow, Russia
e-mail: rgambarato@hse.ru
Abstract. Th is paper discusses design process as a creative activity along with 
conceptual correlations of the semiotics developed by Charles Sanders Peirce. Th e 
central aim of this paper is to examine one of the most important concepts in Peirce’s 
theory related to design praxis: the concept of abduction. Abduction is the driving 
force behind creation and a way of producing new ideas. Peirce’s original concept 
is fundamental in order to maintain constant commitment to innovation required 
by design. To transmit messages in a creative way it is more effi  cient to intensely 
work with associations by similarity in order to obtain signs rich in information 
and analogies. Design communicates by all its constituent elements: shape, 
function, colour, material, technique, technology, etc. Th erefore, signs of design 
share peculiar values of artistic signs as well as those of communicative ones. Th e 
associated information is as much aesthetic (shape) as it is semantic (content). Th e 
appropriation of Peircean concepts contributes to the understanding of the creative 
process, which in turn is crucial for understanding new possibilities by means of 
design.
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1. Introduction
Semiotics of design refl ects on the communicative potential of objects: the trans-
formation of objects into signs. Th is paper shares the standpoint of Max Bense 
(1971), Roland Barthes (1980), and Bernhard Bürdek (1991) who consider design 
as a language, a sign system. Th is particular characteristic of design will be discussed 
to conclude that the basic purpose of design lies in a sense of freedom, the absence of 
conditioning, and an elimination of the obvious. Th us, the fundamental focus here is 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s concept of abduction. In the aesthetic universe, abduction 
behaves as a set of hypotheses, of possibilities. Abduction includes every “process of 
generation, criticism, and possible acceptance of explanatory hypotheses” ( Josephson, 
Josephson 1994: 9). Th e moment of formulation of a new hypothesis is poetic because 
at this point creativity is generated. Abduction was Peirce’s creation: previously, just 
induction and deduction had been considered methods of reasoning. Th e theory of 
abduction, in its more complete description, dates from 1901 and comes from Peirce’s 
manuscripts (CP 7.202–219). Th e term “abduction” was developed in substitution of 
the word “hypothesis” because Peirce, as he moved forward in the studies of scientifi c 
investigation, identifi ed another step in the process through which ideas and theories 
are engendered (CP 5.590). Th is led him to reject “hypothesis” and introduce the 
term “abduction” instead (Santaella 1992: 91). 
It is pertinent to highlight that discovery happens when a hypothesis made has 
been proven true. However, in the aesthetic realm the objective is not to search for 
hypotheses that are proven true; it is just a set of hypotheses contained in the universe 
of possibilities. It is intrinsic to abduction, though, to point at a true hypothesis 
with enough theoretical foundation to indicate a direction, which is probably true. 
According to Peirce, abduction has the tendency of raising correct hypotheses due 
to man’s natural instinct, or Galileo’s il lume naturale (CP 6.477). Th e human mind 
is part of nature and there is no duality between mind and matt er. Th erefore, there 
is co-naturalness between mind and nature and both are developed together. Th e 
instinct for the truth is natural. Th e human capacity to guess correct hypotheses is 
the notion of “insight” in Peirce’s theory (CP 5.181). Moreover, he stated: a) insight 
is not an immediate premise; b) truth is not an individual consciousness; and c) 
insight is not indubitable. 
In spite of its instinctive character, abduction is a logical inference and the 
important question that derives from it is which premises would be the ones 
of abduction. Th ere are no exact rules for the occurrence of abduction because 
freedom is its main characteristic. Abduction does not follow a logical formula, but 
initiates explanatory forms. Th is makes plenty of sense, considering that no rule or 
pre-established structure could provide the appearance of something actually new. 
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2. Abduction and perception
Abduction is not innate; it presupposes a cognitive elaboration, but its fi rst 
premises are unconscious. At this point, it is necessary to delve into Peirce’s theory 
of perception to locate the fi rst premises. Th e Peircean theory of perception was 
elaborated in the fi rst years of the 20th century with the purpose of solving impasses 
of semiotics related to the connection between language and reality. It was structured 
proceeding from a triad of logical elements (CP 7.642–681): 
–  percept: it is external; it is what we observe; it comes and it continues. Th e percept 
is “what we immediately perceive and is the reality” (CP 5.568). It behaves as the 
dynamic object of the sign in the process of semiosis. Th e percept is related to 
what is apprehended by the perceptive act (Santaella 1998: 54); 
–  percipuum: It is the percept as it is interpreted by the perceptual judgment (CP 
7.629). It is the way the percept will be received by our sensory-motor system. 
Th us, the percipuum behaves as an immediate object, shaping the percept. It is 
the interface between the mind (perceptual judgment) and the world (percept) 
(Santaella 1998: 59); 
–  perceptual judgment: It is the fl ow of thought; it is what will process things we 
are discerning. It is the mental schemes of what we are endowed with. It is a 
sign. Th e perception is determined by the percept, but the percept can only be 
known through the mediation of the sign, which is the judgment of perception 
(Santaella 1998: 64). Th e perceptual judgment is a logical inference and Peirce 
considered it as a peculiar type of inference: abduction (CP 5.180). 
Consequently, it is possible to establish similarities and diff erences between 
abduction and perceptual judgment. Both are endowed with general principles 
that drive them; they are hypothetical and, therefore, they can be fallible. Th e main 
diff erence is that, although fallible, the perceptual judgment is indubitable (CP 
5.442). We would not endure always doubting every moment of our judgments of 
perception. However, as concerns abduction, it is necessary to always criticize it. 
Th ere is no absolute creativity; abduction occurs on pre-existing premises. 
Intuition comes from these previous premises (inferences). Santaella (1993: 41) 
underscores that Peirce, arguing that we can never know with certainty if cognition 
is, in fact, original, maintained his conviction that any cognition is determined by 
other cognition, which meant an att ack on the Aristotelian-Cartesian postulate that 
the fi rst premises of demonstration are not demonstrable. Cartesianism is docked 
in the safe harbour of intuition. It founds knowledge on intuition, considering it 
certain and infallible, because the reasoning should have an origin not deduced 
from any other intuition. If that kind of original proposition is undoubtedly right, 
it is because an intuitive and instantaneous mental act was reached. Th ese sources 
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of propositions either cannot be demonstrated or do not need a demonstration 
because they satisfy what is requested to get to the certainty of knowledge (Santaella 
1993: 42).
Peirce totally disagreed with the above statement. For him, cognition comes as 
a continuous process expressed by means of deductive, inductive and abductive 
inferences, not having a specifi c origin of the process. Inferences “are movements 
of thought within the sphere of belief. Th e function of inference is the acceptance 
(or sometimes rejection) of propositions on the basis of purported evidence” 
( Josephson, Josephson 1994: 12). Peirce (EP 2:348) divides inference into the 
following trichotomy: (a) conscious reasoning resulting from guiding principles; 
(b) informal reasoning without the recognition of the guiding principles; and (c) 
unconscious and uncontrollable mental operations. While denying the innate ideas 
or original premises, Peirce considered the unconscious inferences (abduction) as 
knowledge formative of – and responsible for – our innovative ideas. 
In this context, the term “play of musement” is introduced as the beginning 
of abductive thought, of the conjecture of instinctive reasoning. Peirce developed 
this idea in 1908 in the manuscript Th e Neglected Argument for the Reality of God 
(CP  6.452–485). Musement does not have an a priori purpose, but it can be the 
principle of the appearance of innovative ideas. It is a deep refl ection in order to ar-
ticulate signs by means of possibilities of composition. Th e new thought was born 
free and it is formulated from the associations of ideas by: 
–  contiguity that corresponds to an elementary reasoning, a familiar knowledge 
(CP 7.218) in which ideas are associated because they are close; they are sug-
gested by daily experience, which impoverishes the originality and the creative 
production of ideas;
–  similarity that is a higher reasoning; it is a conscious process in which ideas 
are approached by some equality, some analogy. Peirce considers icons as 
signs that stand for their objects by  similarity  or resemblance (CP 2.247; 
CP  2.276; CP  8.335). Similarity emphasizes the creative aspect because it is 
not the resemblance between ideas or facts that allows the association, but it 
is the association, as control of the reasoning, that produces the resemblance. 
Similarity can occur by resemblance of quality, juxtaposition or mediation. Th e 
fi rst one happens when identity of qualitative characteristics exists among parts 
of the sign; when the parts, in their physical and sensitive materiality, present 
qualities. Secondly, there is the resemblance of juxtaposition. In this case, in spite 
of elements being diff erent, the proximity among them gives rise to resemblances. 
Ideogram is an example of this sort of association. Th e third way, characterised 
by mediation, happens when a third term produced in the mind that can unite 
two states of consciousness, for instance, verbal and visual metaphors. 
428 Renira Rampazzo Gambarato
Th ese two main terms (similarity and contiguity) were developed by David Hume 
(1711–1776) in the 18th century, but it was Peirce who identifi ed similarity as a 
special way to produce ideas. Accordingly, it would be possible to relate similarity 
with musement. Th ere is no accident in the association of ideas; there is a 
harmonious tendency, in Peirce’s words “aff ection” (CP 6.307) that takes charge of 
creative associations generated by the play of musement. For Peirce, “play” is a lively 
exercise of our power because pure play does not have rules, except the true law of 
freedom. If our observations and refl ections have the opportunity to specialize, the 
play will transform itself into scientifi c study (CP: 6.458).  
Peirce makes use of the idea of play developed by Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), 
the German poet and philosopher who studied aesthetics. Schiller’s refl ections 
concerning beauty tend to be built not upon subjectivity, but upon universal 
reasoning. Schiller developed the concept of aesthetic play, which is linked to the 
feeling of free sequence of ideas; of free fl ow of images to the detriment of external 
impressions. Th e idea of play is the idea of freedom. For Schiller, creative activity 
can reach a quality close to the ideal only through the independence of reality. Th e 
philosopher builds up his concept of aesthetic play starting from the defi nition of 
three impulses (or drives)1 that are part of it: (a) the sensitive impulse (Sinnestrieb); 
(b) the formal impulse (Formtrieb); and (c) the playful impulse (Spieltrieb). 
Th e sensitive impulse – or sensuous drive – is action and reaction in the real world. 
It is instinct and materiality. Th e sensitive impulse wants modifi cation to happen; it 
wants to be determined; it wants to receive its object. Th e sensitive impulse excludes 
spontaneity and freedom. Th e formal impulse is abstract and rational. 
Th e formal impulse wants time to be suppressed; there is no modifi cation; it 
wants to determine its object. Th e formal impulse excludes any dependence and 
passivity. Th ese two ways converge in the playful impulse or the play drive which 
is a mediator between the sensitive and the formal, and generates aesthetic play. 
Th e playful impulse recovers freedom and accentuates artistic beauty (Schiller 
1954). It can be recognized that the aesthetic play of Schiller, based on the playful 
impulse, is similar to the Peircean play of musement. Both concepts, therefore, can 
be characterised as the genetic atmosphere of abduction. Abduction is the driving 
force behind creation and the way of producing new ideas. Th e original concept 
of Peirce’s is fundamental for the maintenance of the constant commitment to the 
inherent innovation required by design.  
1 Schiller’s pivotal book On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Lett ers was fi rst 
published in 1794 as Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen. He 
argues that it is possible to elevate people’s moral character by touching their souls with beauty. 
In the book, he goes beyond the dualism between Formtrieb and Sinnestrieb proposing the notion 
of Spieltrieb. Th e German word Trieb could be understood as drive, impulse, or instinctive need. 
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3. An icon to the wise is suffi  cient
 
Design as language – this is the particularity of design to be investigated. Language 
is the ability to represent. Representation occurs by means of signs. A sign is in real 
substitution with its object and from this substitution an interpretant is generated 
(CP 1.346). Th e several kinds of languages are systematised by their codes or sets 
of signs. Each language possesses its own specifi c rules. From this dialogue among 
codes, messages are established and organised. Design depends on language 
operators, who will use new technologies, materials, and charac teristics of the 
consuming market and so forth to operate translations of languages in order to 
develop products. 
Products can be qualifi ed as signs as anything can be a sign for somebody (CP 
2.228). Products, placed in a social repertoire, ought to communicate their function 
and emit their message. To transmit messages in a creative way, by means of design, it 
is effi  cient to intensely work with associations by similarity in order to obtain signs rich 
in information and analogies. Design communicates by all its constituent elements: 
shape, function, colour, material, technique, technology, etc. Th erefore, signs of design 
join peculiar values from artistic signs as well as from communicative ones. Th e 
associated information is as much aesthetic (shape) as it is semantic (content).  
According to Peirce, all signs congregate three categories of his phenome nology 
presenting characteristics of fi rstness, secondness and thirdness. However, through 
the classifi cation of signs in his semiotics, he draws att ention to the fact that, despite 
their coexistence, one of the categories always prevails. In this sense, fi rstness is 
the predominant essence of the iconic sign (CP  2.276). We could perceive that 
designing is a process of genesis in which the designer wields an endless repertoire 
of elements capable of defi ning aesthetic and functional specifi c characteristics of 
products. Th e act of designing is, therefore, selective. In other words, to make an 
object that exists and works in the material world, it is necessary to choose some 
constituent elements at the expense of others to defi ne its conditions of existence. In 
order to select the constituent elements, associative processes are used, as discussed 
above. Th e richness of the icon is directly related to the association by similarity that 
off ers plenty of communicative possibilities and analogies. An icon by similarity 
produces a rhetorical fi gure called metaphor. In the context of Peircean semiotics, 
the metaphor is considered as a peculiar sort of hypoicon (CP 2.276). Hypoicons are 
subdivided according to the kind of fi rstness they take part in. Th e kind of hypoicon 
called metaphor is one that portrays the representative character of the sign through 
the representation of a parallelism with something else (CP 2.277). In terms of 
metaphoric sense, the message-product acquires rich interpretative possibilities. 
Undoubtedly, metaphors play an important role nowadays due to the fact that visual 
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analogy can improve the practical functions of products (Bürdek 1991). Th erefore, 
in order for a visual analogy to increase the practical functions of products, a great 
elaboration of syntax is necessary to create the suspension of meanings, which 
means promoting the ambiguity, promoting relativity, and removing the absolute 
sense of the sign (Turin 1992: 44). 
Design needs this ambiguity (characteristic of art) to escape from the creation 
of merely conventional products that are already known. It is necessary to establish 
unexpected relations that are neither obvious and nor previously accomplished. In 
order to produce such an eff ect of ambiguity as regards the consumer the sign must be 
tied to the interpretant. Objects carry their own information which is refl ected in the 
ways of using them. Th e task of the designer is to make objects speak for themselves. 
As it has been argued, it does not mean designers should always work with symbols 
(in the Peircean sense) only, in order to be understood by the consumers. Designers’ 
work should contribute to the improvement of the users’ repertoire, as they transmit 
diff erent messages, and project immateriality. It is necessary to create intelligible 
objects capable of establishing the communication process and not just to develop 
mere copies of objects that already exist or are thoroughly known. 
4. Conclusion
Th e basic purpose of design or the language of design lies in the sense of freedom, 
lack of conditioning, and elimination of the obvious. In order to achieve this goal, 
designers should focus on designing iconic signs:
Icons are also necessary to create new ideas, since the only way to conveying 
new ideas is by means of a “complexus of […] icons”. We can only create new 
ideas by transforming existing images. Only by means of a conjunction or a 
disjunction of icons can we arrive at “composite images of which the whole is 
not [yet] familiar” (CP 3.433). (Nöth 2000: 26) 
It is important to fi nd similarities and analogies in order to escape the conventional 
and the arbitrary. Th is is the beginning of creation, i.e., conscious creation. Con-
sciousness works with relations of substitution, the relations between sign/object/
interpretant. Consciousness is processing incessantly with constant alteration. It is a 
dynamic process of generation of interpretants which are neither absolute nor static, 
otherwise the conservatism, the stagnation of the creative process will be favoured. 
Th is kind of substitution process by new interpretants is called infi nite semiosis (CP 
1.339, CP 2.303). Th e creative process in design has the objective of associating 
signs and generating new interpretants. 
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Certainly, each consumer will produce diff erent interpretants related to the same 
object according to his/her informational level and within his/her own repertoire. 
Th e variability of signifi cation is a desirable characteristic of design. Th e generation 
of interpretants that are constantly being updated can transform the iconic character 
of the object into a symbolic character by means of the simplifi cation of its social 
use. Th e appropriation of Peircean concepts contributes to the understanding of 
the creative process, which in turn is crucial for understanding new possibilities by 
means of design. An icon to the wise is suffi  cient. 
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Семиотика Пирса в контексте практического дизайна: 
диалог абдукции и перцепции
Процесс дизайна как творческое действие рассматривается в статье в рамках семиотики 
Чарльза Пирса. Главная цель статьи – рассмотрение концепта абдукции, который наиболее 
тесно связан с практическим дизайном. Именно абдукция включает творческий процесс и 
является одним из способов создания новых идей. Для творческой передачи сообщений 
необходима интенсивная работа с ассоциациями, в результате чего получаются богатые 
информацией и аналогиями знаки. Коммуникация в дизайне производится посредством 
всех составляющих его элементов: форма, функция, цвет, материал, техника, технология 
и т.п. Таким образом, в знаках дизайна соединяются художественные и коммуникативные 
ценности, передаваемая информация является одновременно и эстетической (форма) и 
семантической (содержание).   
Peirce’i semiootika disainipraktika kontekstis: 
abduktsiooni ja pertseptsiooni dialoog
Artiklis käsitletakse disainiprotsessi kui loomingulist tegevust mõistelises korrelatsioonis 
Charles Sanders Peirce’i semiootikaga. Artikli keskseks eesmärgiks on uuri da üht Peirce’i teooria 
kõige olulisemat disainipraktikaga seotud mõistet: abduktsiooni mõis tet. Abduktsioon on 
loomingut käivitavaks jõuks ning üheks uute ideede loomise viisiks. Peirce’i originaalne mõiste on 
fundamentaalne, hoidmaks alal disaini poolt nõutavat jätkuvat pühendumust uuenduslikkusele. 
Selleks, et sõnumeid loominguliselt edastada, on tõhusam intensiivne töö sarnasuse kaudu 
toimivate assotsiatsioonidega, et saada tulemuseks informatsiooni- ja analoogiaterikkaid märke. 
Disaini kommunikatsioon toimub kõigi seda moodustavate elementide – vormi, funktsiooni, 
värvuse, materjali, tehnika, tehnoloogia jne – kaudu. Seega ühinevad disainimärkides kunstilistele 
märkidele omased väärtused kommunikatiivsete märkide omadega. Ühendatud informatsioon 
on samavõrra nii esteetiline (kuju) kui ka semantiline (sisu). Peirce’i mõistete kasutuselevõtt  
aitab kaasa loomeprotsessi mõistmisele, mis on oluline disaini abil uutest võimalustest aru 
saamise protsessis.
